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Abstract
This paper presents a new taxonomy of sex/gender concepts based on the idea
of starting with a few basic components of the sex/gender system, and exhausting
the possible types of simple associations and identities based on these. The resulting
system is significantly more fine-grained than most competitors, and helps to clarify
a number of points of confusion and conceptual tension in academic and activist
conversations about feminism, transgender politics, and the social analysis of gender.
1 Introduction
Activists and academics often distinguish between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, but the intended
meaning of (especially) the latter is not uniform across different conversations. Even
when ‘gender’ is explicitly defined, it is often called upon to do conceptual work that goes
beyond the definition provided. As Mikkola (2016) puts it, ‘The terms “sex” and “gender”
mean different things to different feminist theorists and neither are easy or straightforward
to characterise.’ This presents a challenge for conversations about ‘gender’ involving more
than one scholarly or activist community, and for foundational work on the philosophy of
gender.
This paper explores the heterogeneity of ‘gender’ talk, with a goal of replacing the
‘sex’/‘gender’ distinction with a more fine-grained system in which different ‘gender’ con-
cepts can be situated and compared. A mature theory of gender may find some of my
distinctions superfluous, or some of my categories reducible to others, but the goal here is
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to avoid presupposing such reductions, and to make explicit the presuppositions of various
existing accounts. I hope this will provide a language in which the merits and drawbacks
of different proposed reductions and identifications can be debated, and allow the more in-
teresting distinctions picked out by different sorts of gender talk to be considered together
without awkward collisions of terminology.
I begin by exploring some issues with the current overburdened terms.
1.1 Slogans
Let’s begin with a popular baseline definition: ‘gender is the social interpretation of sex’.
As feminist theorists, we presumably have some prior (if vague) notion of what sorts of
phenomena are associated with sex. Any of these that are ‘social’ will then belong to
gender. The ‘social’ requirement, however, is so weak that it excludes, at most, only ‘sex’
proper.
To get a handle on how this plays out, consider a (very small) slice of the sex/gender
system. (A) enumerates (and labels) a few traits, norms, and so on within the system, and
Figure 1 takes a first pass at visualizing them and their interactions and dependencies.
(Throughout this paper the figures are intended as an intuitive supplement, and are, in
their information content, almost entirely redundant with the prose. Readers who find
them difficult counterintuitive can ignore them without having to worry that they are
missing anything.)
(A) A slice of the sex/gender system:
1 Breasts, facial hair, enlarged larynx...
1-id Liking one’s breasts, discomfort with one’s enlarged larynx,
wanting facial hair...
2 Neckties, skirts, mascara...
2-id Wanting to wear a necktie, preference for not wearing mascara,
enjoying wearing skirts...
3 The social categories ‘Woman’, ‘Man’...
3-id Thinking of oneself as a ‘man’, wanting recognition as a ‘woman’,
discomfort with being called a ‘woman’...
1↔2 The norms that facial hair goes with neckties and not skirts,
that breasts go with skirts and not neckties, ...
1↔3 The norms that being a ‘woman’ goes with breasts and not facial hair,
that being a ‘man’ goes with facial hair and not breasts, ...
3↔2 The norms that being a ‘woman’ goes with skirts and not neckties,
that being ‘man’ goes with neckties and not skirts, ...
If we recognize any notion of biological sex, only the sex characteristics in 1 will belong
to it, so ‘sex’ will pick out just what is highlighted in Figure 2.
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Figure 1: A Slice of the Sex/Gender System
Everything else on the list – and indeed everything in the system except perhaps ‘sex’
proper – is plausibly ‘social’, so ‘gender’ now becomes a wastebasket: any part of the
system worthy of study or recognition, but excluded from ‘sex’ proper, will be assigned
to ‘gender’. ‘Gender’ thus includes everything in (A) except 1, yielding the unwieldy
and conceptually heterogeneous picture of ‘gender’ that includes everything highlighted
in Figure 3. (Compare Mikkola’s (2016) enumeration of ‘social role, position, behaviour
or identity’ as belonging to ‘gender’.)
This wastebasket approach is not a recipe for a coherent or useful category: few valu-
able generalizations can be made across such fundamentally different components. What
it is is a recipe for is innocent misunderstanding or less innocent equivocation. Many
theorists and activists who speak of gender do not really mean to speak of all the things
enumerated above, and, even when two speakers are using ‘gender’ with the same exten-
sion, they are often focused on very different parts of the system.
When two theorists of ‘gender’ have in mind different components, they may find them-
selves in dispute not because of substantial disagreement, but because they misunderstand
the intent of each other’s ‘gender’ talk. More troublingly, the unification of diverse phe-
nomena under the heading of ‘gender’ gives cover to bad arguments – one may motivate
a perspective on ‘gender’ by focusing on one part of the system, and then pronounce on
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Figure 2: ‘Sex’
‘gender’ as a whole, including logically independent ‘gender’ phenomena not covered by
the original argument, but connected by the illusion of ‘gender’ as a natural category.
The situation is complicated by narrower characterizations of ‘gender’, which are often
given often without any explicit recognition that they depart from the ‘social interpretation
of sex’ picture. Consider, e.g., a traditional simplified ‘trans 101’ line: ‘sex is what’s
between your legs; gender is what’s between your ears’.1 This characterization of ‘sex’ has
some problems, but let’s focus on the treatment of ‘gender’.
This slogan’s notion of ‘gender’ is more internally-focused2 and narrower than the ‘so-
cial interpretation of sex’ characterization: the focus is on personal identity, as understood
in terms of an individual’s distinctive mental traits – roughly what is called one’s ‘gender
identity’. Thus, it is usually understood as including only 1-id, 2-id, and 3-id from our
above list, as highlighted in Figure 4.
Other slogans can be found in circulation, including ‘sex is male and female; gender is
1Many transgender activists and educators regard this slogan as misleading and harmful (correctly, in
my view as a transfeminine person), but it still has widespread cultural currency.
2I leave aside questions about which notions of mental content can accurately be characterized as
‘between the ears’ because it is clear that, in the settings where this slogan is used, it is meant to cover
most forms of mental content, independent of such foundational concerns.
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Figure 3: ‘Gender’ as ‘the Social Interpretation of Sex’
masculine and feminine’ and ‘sex is male and female; gender is man and woman’.3 Setting
aside the difficulties of ‘male’ and ‘female’, the first of these seems to include under ‘gender’
one or both of 2 and 2-id, while excluding everything else (cf. Figure 5), and the latter
seems to limit ‘gender’ to 3 (cf. Figure 6).
Different slogans have ‘gender’ picking out entirely different parts of the system, and
some bite off much more than others. These differences in breadth and focus invite mis-
understanding and equivocation.
To see how these differences can cause problems, consider the traditional (simplistic and
widely criticized) characterization of transgender experience in terms of mismatch between
sex and gender. Here ‘gender’ is understood as something like gender identity – roughly
what’s picked out by ‘what’s between your ears’. Meanwhile, arguments that ‘gender’ is
oppressive employ something like the expansive ‘social meaning of sex’ characterization,
with a focus on the norms that render sex socially meaningful – that is, they are most
concerned with ‘gender’ as sex-specific norms of the sort exemplified by 1↔2, 1↔3, and
3↔2.
3Both of these slogans have the further problem that they leave out the possibility of nonbinary or
intermediate options for sex and gender – this is an important criticism of these slogans, but one that is
more or less orthogonal to my concern here.
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Figure 4: ‘Gender’ as ‘What’s Between Your Ears’ (aka ‘Gender Identity’)
Bringing together conversations that employ different notions of ‘gender’ can, unsur-
prisingly, lead to confusion.4 Consider a meeting between one activist using ‘between your
ears’ identity-focused characterization (i.e., 1-id, 3-id, and 2-id), and another using the
‘social interpretation of sex’ characterization, and especially concerned with 1↔2, 1↔3,
and 3↔2. There is, of course, no reason why respecting the former identities should pre-
vent one from condemning the latter norms, but ‘gender’ talk introduces the appearance
of conflict.
Our ‘between your ears’ activist will insist that ‘gender’ (meant in the ‘gender identity’
sense) is to be tolerated, supported, and respected. Our ‘social interpretation’ activist will
hear in this an endorsement of the ‘gender’ system as a whole, of which they take the norms
to be the most salient parts. Since these norms are credibly important forces of sexist
oppression, our ‘social interpretation’ activist will next accuse our ‘between your ears’
activist of holding an antifeminist position. This will, rightly, strike our ‘between your ears’
activist as inappropriate, because they were never talking about those norms, or anything
else obviously oppressive. Different choices of slogans would provide other examples of this
4When I speak of confusion, error, or misunderstanding, I don’t mean to suggest that there is no blame
to be allocated. The question of when misunderstanding is and isn’t blameworthy is beyond the scope of
this paper.
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Figure 5: ‘Gender’ as ‘Masculine and Feminine’ (one possible interpretation)
sort. This type of mismatch between different uses of ‘gender’ is arguably a major force
behind not only good-faith misunderstanding, but bad-faith efforts to exploit the resulting
confusion to support unfounded attacks against (among others) trans communities and
activists.
The above has hinted at some desirable components of a finer-grained gender taxon-
omy: beyond biological sex traits, gendered behaviors, and gender classes like ‘woman’
and ‘man’, we must consider norms connecting these, and personal identities associated
with them. If we individuate the different building blocks of the gender system in a mod-
erately fine-grained way, and if we give the various pieces a little combinatorial freedom,
we turn out to derive a larger-than-standard inventory of ‘gender’ concepts, helping to
clarify some of the confusions suggested above.
1.2 The Gender Dysphoria Diagnosis
As another example of the problems with mainstream conceptions of ‘gender’, consider the
gender dysphoria diagnosis from the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (2013).5 The criteria for gender dysphoria in adults and adolescents
5The DSM’s inadequacies on this topic have been discussed elsewhere, but it remains a useful example.
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Figure 6: ‘Gender’ as ‘Man and Woman’
are given by (B), and the criteria for children are given by (C).
(B) A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and assigned
gender, of at lest 6 months’ duration, as manifested by at least two of the following:
1. A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and pri-
mary or secondary sex characteristics (or in young adolescents, the anticipated
sex characteristics).
2. A strong desire to be rid of one’s primary and/or secondary sex characteristics
because of a marked incongruence with one’s experienced/expressed gender
(or in young adolescents, a desire to prevent development of the anticipated
sex characteristics).
3. A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of the
other gender.
4. A strong desire to be of the other gender (or some alternative gender different
from one’s assigned gender).
5. A strong desire to be treated as the other gender (or some alternative gender
different from one’s assigned gender).
6. A strong feeling that one has the typical feelings and reactions of the other
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gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender).
(C) A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and assigned
gender,of at least 6 months’ duration, as manifested by at least six of the following
(one of which must be [the first criterion):
1. A strong desire to be of the other gender or an insistence that one is the other
gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender).
2. In boys (assigned gender), a strong preference for cross-dressing or simulating
female attire; or in girls (assigned gender) a strong preference for wearing
typical masculine clothing and a strong resistance to the wearing of typical
feminine clothing.
3. A strong preference for cross-gender roles in make-believe play or fantasy play.
4. A strong preference for the toys, games, or activities stereotypically used or
engaged in by the other gender.
5. A strong preference for playmates of the other gender.
6. In boys (assigned gender), a strong rejection of typically masculine toys, games,
and activities and a strong avoidance of rough-and-tumble play; or in girls
(assigned gender), a strong rejection of typically feminine toys, games, and
activities.
7. A strong dislike of one’s sexual anatomy.
8. A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics that
match one’s experienced gender.
It seems fair to say that these criteria are getting at more than one thing.
The notion of ‘experienced/expressed’ gender is apparently concerned with gender
identity or gendered inclinations as features of the individual. The individual experiences
dysphoria when they have an identity that is not recognized by others, or when they
have inclinations that they are prevented from realizing. ‘Experienced/expressed’ gender
is apparently given the status of a coherent concept underlying a unified diagnosis, but a
closer look yields at least three distinct kinds of identification/inclination. First, there’s
identification/inclination with respect to biological sex characteristics: criteria 1, 2, and 3
for adults and adolescents, and 7 and 8 for children, involve a sense of mismatch between
one’s current or anticipated biology and one’s preferred biology (compare 1-id above).
Second, we have inclination towards gendered behaviors and activities: this is is perhaps
illustrated most clearly by child criteria 2, 3, 4, and 6, and to some extent adult criterion
6 (compare 2-id above). Finally, most vaguely, we have the desire for recognition of one’s
membership in a gender class: this is arguably suggested by adult criteria 4 and 5 and
child criterion 1 (compare 3-id above). Critically, these are separable: nothing necessitates
any connection at all between one’s preferred activities, one’s preferred label, and one’s
preferred biology.
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To capture all these differences, we’ll want to distinguish sex, gender class, and gender
expression, and to discuss (as distinct from these three) identities/inclinations with respect
to each.
1.3 Refinement Projects
The limitations of a simple sex/gender distinction has motivated many refinements, a few
of which I discuss below.
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Figure 7: Mikkola’s (2010) ‘Descriptive Traits’
Available reform proposals are, at best, only modestly more fine-grained than the
two-part system. For example, Mikkola (2010) proposes scrapping the ‘sex’/‘gender’ dis-
tinction in favor of a distinction between ‘descriptive traits’ (things like facial hair (1) and
skirts (2)) and ‘evaluative norms’ (mainly things like 1↔2, 1↔3, and 3↔2). In terms of
my graphical representations, Mikkola’s (2010) distinction seems to be a nodes-vs.-edges
distinction. In this sense, it is more conceptually natural than the sex/gender distinc-
tion. By collapsing the distinction between biological sex characteristics and gendering of
behaviors, it reflects a variety of important criticisms related to the arbitrariness of this
division. As such, it represents a useful way of dividing things up, and it is valuable for
framing one sort of activist project: the project of freeing various descriptive traits from
the constraints of evaluative norms. There are also some drawbacks. Most obviously, it
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Figure 8: Mikkola’s (2010) ‘Evaluative Norms’ (one possible interpretation)
doesn’t give a clear place to gender identity and gendered inclinations like 1-id, 2-id, and 3-
id above. I am not sure whether Mikkola regards these as psychological descriptive traits,
or whether they belong outside of her system, but either way they seem under-addressed.
Collapsing the distinction between sexed biology and gendered behavior further denies us
the tools to analyze and compare current conversations about gender. As a proposal about
which way of dividing the system should be prioritized, Mikkola’s approach is appealing,
but as a basis for a relatively neutral language that can be used to sharpen and compare
competing ‘gender’ concepts, it is suboptimal.
Another type of refinement, associated with transgender theory and activism, intro-
duces many subdivisions of ‘gender’. Serano (2007), for example, offers ‘subconscious
sex’, public gender identity, and ‘intrinsic inclinations’ as distinct components of ‘gender’.
McKinnon (2016), meanwhile, employs such notions as ‘gender roles’, ‘gender expression’,
‘gender attribution’, and ‘gender identity’. In discussion of transgender issues, the gender
dysphoria is sometimes divided into ‘body dysphoria’ and ‘social dysphoria’, correspond-
ing to Williams’s (2013) distinction between ‘gender orientation’ and ‘gender identity’.
Meanwhile, Jenkins (2015) explicitly contrasts ‘gender as class’ with ‘gender as identity’.
These are insightful incremental improvements, but they are, for the most part, modest
revisions introduced in response to specific problems. They have informed the present
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project, which presents a more exhaustive and systematic application of the kinds of dis-
tinctions and conceptual building blocks involved in these proposals.
2 A New Taxonomy
In this section, I develop a new taxonomy by exploring the combinatorial possibilities of
conceptual components suggested by the above.
I begin with three basic components (the main ‘nodes’ of the sex/gender graph): sexed
biology (also written s) exemplified by 1 above, gendered practice (p), exemplified by 2,
and sex/gender classes (c), exemplified by 3.
I next suggest two kinds of operation to derive new components from these three.
One operation associates basic components x and y with a collection of x-y associations
(A(x, y)). These associations are exemplified by 1↔2, 1↔3, and 3↔2. The other involves
identities/inclinations with respect to each of the basic components. The collection of
identities and inclinations with respect to x will be called x identity and written Ix – such
identities are exemplified by 1-id, 2-id, and 3-id above. The proposed taxonomy can be
visualized as Figure 9.
Below, I discuss each of the combinations made possible by this toolkit.
2.1 Basic Components
2.1.1 Sexed Biology: s
sexed biology, may be abbreviated as s, s biology, or biology. s biology consists of those
biological characteristics which are, in a particular community’s sex/gender system, un-
derstood to be associated with the classification of humans according to distinct roles in
sexual reproduction. s biology may include such traits as presence or absence of a uterus,
presence or absence of testes, presence or absence of a clitoris of ‘normal’ size, presence
or absence of significant quantities of hair on the upper chest and lower face, significant
development of the breasts, presence or absence of a Y chromosome, presence or absence
of more than one X chromosome, or blood testosterone levels above or below 240 ng/dL.
s biology is intended to focus on traits that we are willing to regard as belonging
squarely to biology. The sexes or sex categories, like ‘male’ and ‘female’, are plausibly
sufficiently high-level and removed from whatever we choose to count as the ‘raw’ biological
facts that they should probably be excluded.6
6I am aware that the distinction I am trying to draw here is, at best, a fuzzy one, but I think it is at
least plausible that the choice of criteria that suffice to establish an organism as ‘male’ or ‘female’ is more
remote from any legitimate biological concern with carving reality at the joints than is, say, the choice of
criteria that suffice to establish an organ as an ovary or a testicle.
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Figure 9: Overall Shape of the Taxonomy
s biology captures the traditional notion of biological sex characteristics. In the stan-
dard ‘sex’/‘gender’ picture, s biology is a major component of ‘sex’. For Mikkola (2010)
it falls under the heading of ‘descriptive traits’.
Although s biology seeks to deal in biological traits and not the assignment of these
to higher-level cultural categories, the matter of which traits belong to s biology remains
socially contingent (even if we take as fixed a particular notion of what counts as purely
biological) precisely because the choice of which biological traits are used to determine
the membership of these higher-level categories is a culture-specific choice. Further, the
boundary between s biology and p practice is both fuzzy and culture-dependent. I will
return to this shortly.
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2.1.2 Gendered Practice: p
Now consider the various behaviors and experiences that a particular sex/gender system
assigns gendered meaning (excluding associations and category-concepts, both discussed
below). The intended range of phenomena is exemplified by the following: design of
garments to cover or reveal various parts of the body (e.g., swimwear covering or not
covering certain regions of the chest, everyday attire fully obscuring or not fully obscuring
scalp hair), practices of grooming (e.g., long or short scalp hair, specific fragrances used
in personal hygiene products), forms of labor (e.g., raising children, attending to day-to-
day cleaning and food preparation tasks, being a primary breadwinner, being the default
perpetrator of socially acceptable forms of violence), communication styles (e.g., being
more assertive or more demure, speaking in a manner perceived as more hedged or more
direct), and differences in expression of sexuality (e.g., being more open or more reserved
in one’s discussion of one’s own sexual experience and sexual desires), along with external
experiences like being treated more deferentially or more condescendingly in conversation,
or being exposed to more delicate or rougher childhood play, and the artifacts associated
with any of these (e.g., the various articles of clothing mentioned above).
Call the collection of social traits exemplified by the above gendered practice, abbrevi-
ated as p practice, p, or practice. In the sex/gender taxonomy, p practice belongs squarely
to ‘gender’, and includes most (perhaps all) of ‘gender expression’, ‘gender presentation’,
and ‘performance of gender’. For Mikkola (2010), p practice, like s biology, falls under the
heading of ‘descriptive traits’.
The assignment of specific behaviors, experiences, and artifacts to the gender system,
and so to p practice, is culture-specific. There is also reason to doubt that any sharp
distinction between p practice and s biology is defensible. Nevertheless, keeping the two
distinct is indispensable for the purpose of providing a sufficiently fine-grained vocabulary
to discuss existing disputes in gender theory and gender activism.
p practice, as described here, is already a quite diverse and unwieldy category, and for
many purposes we ought to subdivide it further. I briefly discuss this issue in Section 4.2.
2.1.3 Sex/Gender Classes: c
Next, let’s turn to the system of gender categories to which people may be assigned.
Human societies recognize such categories as ‘man’ and ‘woman’, and in various ways
assign people to these categories. I’ll treat these categories as social objects which can be
associated with with s biology and p practice by norms of association, but which are not
presumed to be reducible to any combination of these. Call such categories sex/gender
classes, c class(es), class(es), or c. Various of the c classes are sometimes said to be
‘the sexes’ or ‘the genders’. Examples of c classes include ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘kathoei’,7
7A transfeminine gender category associated with Thai culture.
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‘burrnesha’,8 ‘eunuch’, ‘intersex’, ‘cisgender’, ‘transgender’, ‘genderqueer’, ‘genderfluid’,
‘nonbinary’, and (in communities where they are distinguished from the preceding) ‘male’
and ‘female’.
By making c classes a basic component of the taxonomy, I don’t mean to deny the
possibility that some or all of them might be reducible to other components of the gender
system, but only to suggest that this not anything like a logical necessity.9 Available
proposals for such reductions are, at best, controversial, and the present goal is to develop
a taxonomy that can frame debates between proposed reductions.
To better understand my reasons for treating genders as distinct social objects, the
reader is invited to consider distinctions of rank, caste, clan, or order that have persisted
over extended periods of time in many societies. Such groups do not seem to be readily
reducible to anything in particular. There are conventions by which group membership
is adjudicated and new members are admitted to a group, but a group may persist in
the wake of reforms that drastically change its criteria for membership. Such groups may
likewise come with behavioral norms, obligations, or stereotypes, but they need not be
reducible to these, and, again, these may change over the history of a group. I wish to leave
open the possibility that the c classes are entities of roughly this sort.10 This possibility is
part of what motivates the treatment of c classes as a distinct component in a framework
for making ‘gender’ talk more precise.
Relative to traditional sex/gender talk, the c classes may include both ‘sex’ and ‘gender’
categories. For those authors who distinguish the ‘sex’ categories ‘male’ and ‘female’ from
the ‘gender’ categories ‘man’ and ‘woman’, all four of these categories will be, in my terms,
c classes.11
2.1.4 Note on the Membership and Individuation of these Components
What exactly belongs to each of s biology, p practice, and c class depends on the particular
community under investigation. For p practice, there are abundant historical and cross-
cultural differences in which behaviors, experiences, and so on are gendered, which are
gender-neutral, and which are entirely absent from the society. For c class, the existence
of culture- or community-specific gender categories raises similar issues. The potential
cultural contingency of s biology may be less obvious, so let’s explore it in a bit more
detail.
8A transmasculine gender category associated with Albanian culture.
9I am, as it happens, suspicious of this type of reduction project, in part for reasons like Reed’s (2013).
10What, then, makes a class a sex/gender class, rather than a rank, caste, clan, order, or the like? This
is question deserves attention, but here I can only note it, and leave it as a problem for future work.
11By recognizing that some communities maintain a system of categories that differentiates ‘sex’ cat-
egories like ‘female’ from ‘gender’ categories like ‘woman’, I do not wish to deny the possibility that it
might be unjustified or pernicious, as suggested by, e.g., Rachel Williams (2015), but, when theorizing
about communities that make such distinctions, it will be useful to treat them as distinct c classes.
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To begin with a trivial example, the status of chromosomes and hormones within any
culture’s conception of s biology is a recent innovation, as humans have only relatively
recently become aware that chromosomes and hormones exist. In many contemporary hu-
man communities, certain aspects of karyotype or hormonal balance are widely regarded
core biological ‘sex’ characteristics, to the point where they often figure prominently in at-
tempted regulatory definitions of ‘sex’, but in past or present societies where chromosomes
and hormones are not objects of human thought at all, they would not be recognized as
sex characteristics, and so it would, at least arguably, be inappropriate to assign them to
s biology for purposes of analyzing the sex/gender systems of those societies.12 But we
would not want to say on this basis that societies that lack awareness of chromosomes
and hormones are in principle incapable of having a concept of biological sex. The more
general lesson here is that biological traits that might be assigned to s biology may go un-
observed by an entire society, or may be observed without anybody thinking to associate
them with sex/gender differentiation.
Another concern, one that speaks to the fuzziness of the boundary between p practice
and s biology, is that physiological traits may be shaped by behavior and experience. For
example, women might be expected to employ various hair removal or obfuscation tech-
nologies (naturally assigned to p practice) to reinforce the stereotyped difference between
male and female facial and body hair, which in turn might reinforce the treatment of
body hair differences as part of s biology. Similarly, men and women might be assigned
different types of physical labor, which might increase or diminish sexed differences in
muscle development. The practice of subjecting infants with ambiguous or incongruous
genitals to surgical ‘normalization’ is another example. Diverse, often horrific, examples
along these lines are imaginable and, in many cases, historically attested. Such practices
vary between communities, leading to variation in what traits are differentiated in ways
that make them candidates for inclusion in s biology.
We find, then, both that the inclusion of traits in s biology is likely to be society-
specific, and that the boundary between p practice and s biology is not an especially
sharp one. In spite of this difficulty, the provisional adoption of some such distinction
is necessary to make sense of many interesting conversations about the social effects of
gender.
A further issue is that arbitrary decisions about the grouping of particulars of biology
and practice into categories are already present within s biology and p practice, suggesting
that there is not a clear, non-arbitrary level of abstraction that distinguishes these from
c class. As with the fuzziness of the boundary between s biology and p practice, this is
worth noting, and merits further exploration, but I don’t think it should deter us from
drawing the distinction.
12They would, of course, still very much be part of the biological makeup of the human members of
those societies.
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Beyond these issues of the membership of s, p, and c, the division of the domain that
they collectively cover into these three components (and the decision to exclude from the
basic components of the system anything that can not be assigned to one of these) is not
the only way to approach these matters: different projects may motivate different choices.
For now, let’s see what we can do with these three.
2.2 Gendered Associations: A(·, ·)
The work of the gender system is not done by the s biology, p practice, or c classes alone.
The mere fact that some people have ovaries and others do not, or that some people
wear trousers more often than others, or that some people are described as ‘women’ and
others are not, does not capture the totality of the gender system or account for the full
force of gendered oppression. Instead, much of the power of the system is to be found in
the gendered associations that draw connections involving the s biology, p practice, and c
classes. These associations may take the form of informal norms, formal rules, stereotypes,
folk-theories, or any of a number of other sorts of association.
To take one example, a society might associate lacking ovaries (s biology) with wearing
trousers (p practice). This association might be an informal standard of proper behavior,
a legal prohibition, or an inferential heuristic. Similarly, there might be an association
dictating that having ovaries (s biology) goes with being a woman (c class), or that being
a woman goes with not being a man, or that being a man goes with not wearing nail
polish. Such associations correspond roughly to Mikkola’s (2010) ‘evaluative norms’.
Where x and y are any of s, p, and c, write A(x, y) (pronounced x-y associations)
for the bundle of all of these sorts of associations between x and y. If we don’t think of
associations as directed (i.e., if we treat A(x, y) and A(y, x) as equivalent), we have six
combinations to consider. Let’s take these one at a time.
2.2.1 Biology-Practice Associations: A(s, p)
The biology-practice associations A(s, p) might include a law dictating that lacking a Y
chromosome (s biology) is sufficient to exempt one from obligatory draft registration
(p practice), or a stereotype that people with conspicuous breast development (s) will
typically wear their hair long (p). Theorists sometimes implicitly or explicitly treat the
biology-practice associations A(s, p) as mediated by the c classes. As a descriptive claim
about social systems, this is a possibility worth considering, but it’s not obvious that it’s
necessitated by the concepts involved. In any case, it will be useful to to treat the biology-
practice associations A(s, p) that occur in a particular sex/gender system as a distinct
component of that system. A major injustice of sexism is the way that an individual gets
assigned to particular treatment or expected behavior (i.e. p practice) on the basis of their
unchosen s biology, and, accordingly, many feminist projects are naturally analyzed in
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terms of opposition to various biology-practice associations A(s, p).
2.2.2 Class-Practice Associations: A(c, p)
Much of the gender-theoretic interest of the c classes comes from the ways they are asso-
ciated with p practice or s biology.
The class-practice associations A(c, p) could include laws banning members of the
‘woman’ class (c class) from certain political and economic activities (p practice), or norms
that members of the ‘man’ class (c) ought to wear trousers (p) and members of the ‘woman’
class (c) bear primary responsibility for child care (p). As a matter of logical possibility,
such associations might persist even if the the c classes were fully uncoupled from the
biological characteristics s biology.13
2.2.3 Class-Biology Associations: A(c, s)
Next, consider the class-biology associations A(c, s). These are at the heart of cissexism,
and include various conventions for defining ‘sex’ classes or identifying certain biologies
as normal for certain c classes. Consider a stereotype that men (c class) have penises (s
biology), or that women (c) have ovaries (s), or a law that defines ‘man’ and ‘woman’
(c) in terms of specific karyotypes (s). As with the previous case, we ought to be willing
to consider the logical possibility of a community with strong class-biology associations
A(c, s), but in which the class-practice associations A(c, p) associations have been effec-
tively abolished.14
2.2.4 Practice-Practice Associations: A(p, p)
Associations between distinct basic components (that is, associations of the form A(x, y),
where x 6= y) are the most obvious kinds of associations, but there are also associations
of the form A(x, x) - that is, of associations within the system of biological s traits, or of
p practices, or c classes.
To begin, then, consider the practice-practice associations A(p, p). These will be norms
and stereotypes associating p practices with each other. These might include, e.g., the
expectation that people doing stereotypically masculine work not do so while wearing
mascara. These associations between independent-in-principle p practices plausibly help
to reinforce the c classes and the class-practice associations A(c, p), by suggesting that
13That is, very roughly, we can imagine a society that is very tolerant of gender transition, but imposes
many kinds of arbitrary discrimination in what kinds of activities it allows to people of different genders.
14That is, very roughly, we can imagine a society that is extremely cissexist in its practices of assign-
ing/recognizing gender class membership, but that nevertheless subjects people of all genders to the same
treatment, and affords all of them the same opportunities.
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‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ (and perhaps other) p practices form natural clusters that
reflect distinct categories of people.
2.2.5 Class-Class Associations: A(c, c)
The class-class associations A(c, c) connect the various c classes. Two kinds of these are
especially salient. First, there are partitioning associations, such as an assumption that
everybody is a woman or a man, and nobody is both. Second, within a system that
recognizes distinct ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ c classes, there may be associations between these.
So, for example, there may be a norm or stereotype that those gendered as ‘women’ are
primarily or exclusively of the ‘female’ sex class, or that such women are more normal or
authentic than other women. In societies where the c classes are so organized that certain
more specialized c classes are understood as special cases of the more general ‘woman’ and
‘man’ classes, these implicational/subclass relationships would also belong to A(c, c).
2.2.6 Biology-Biology Associations: A(s, s)
Finally, biology-biology associations A(s, s) might include norms and stereotypes saying
that people without Y chromosomes do not possess penises or experience significant beard
growth, that a person with testes and significant breast development is to be regarded
as unnatural or medically defective, or that the same person should not experience both
significant breast development and significant beard growth. Just as the practice-practice
associations A(p, p) might serve to cluster p practices in a way that reinforces c classes
and class-practice associations A(c, p) associations, so biology-biology associations A(s, s)
might serve to reinforce c classes and class-biology associations A(c, s).
2.3 Identities and Inclinations: I
Another major component of the gender system involves gender identity and gendered
inclinations. Gender identity is often spoken of as a unified property of an individual,
but in various activist and transgender community settings it has long been recognized
that it combines a number of distinct kinds of targets for identification.15 For now, let’s
consider just our three basic components as possible targets of identification. That is,
one may have some personal identification relationship with various aspects of one’s s
biology, one’s membership or non-membership in certain c classes, or one’s involvement
or non-involvement with certain p practices.
15For example Cristan Williams (2015) lists ‘subjective experience of one’s own sexed attributes’ and
‘culturally influenced sexed identification within the context of a social grouping’ as distinct things that
can be meant by ‘gender identity’, and, e.g., Reed (2012) suggests a diversity of different kinds of physio-
logical and social gender dysphoria, which may be present or absent in any given individual, suggesting a
corresponding diversity of distinct identity components.
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The issue of the nature of the relevant sort of ‘identity’ is more generally vexed, and is
beyond the scope of this paper.16 For now, let Ix, pronounced x-identity, contain all the
ways in which a person may may identify with, form their identity in terms of, be inclined
towards shaping their life and conduct in terms of x.
2.3.1 Biology-Identity: Is
Biology-identity Is involves personal identification with, or inclination/desire to mani-
fest/possess, a particular s biology. This includes both various kinds of psychological
attachment to, or construction of one’s identity in terms of, the s traits of one’s body as it
exists, and various feelings of incompatibility with the s traits of one’s body, or desire to
change these traits. This seems to be the core component of Serano’s (2007) ‘subconscious
sex’. In the transgender context, this is the kind of identity or inclination relevant to body
dysphoria.
2.3.2 Practice-Identity: Ip
Practice-identity Ip is, analogously, identification with or inclination towards p practices.
This might be a weak personal preference for certain hobbies or attire, or for a particu-
lar career, or it might involve regarding some particular gendered behaviors or traits as
essential to one’s sense of personal identity and to one’s ability to achieve a fulfilling life.
2.3.3 Class-Identity: Ic
Class-identity Ic involves self-identification with respect to the system of c classes. This is
one’s sense of oneself as a member of a category like ‘man’ or ‘woman’, or one’s desire to
be recognized as such by others. This is the notion of identity implicated in some social
dysphoria, and is the identity that is disrespected when someone is misgendered.
3 Some Applications
3.1 Heterogeneity of ‘Gender’
What in the above taxonomy corresponds to ‘gender’? All twelve of the items discussed
above plausibly involve either sex or its social interpretation, so, at the very least, every-
thing not part of the traditional category ‘sex’ is plausibly part of ‘gender’. In light of
this, let’s begin with ‘sex’.
16For some discussion of identity and of what it is to have an identity or to self-identify, see Diaz-Leon
(2016), Jenkins (2015), Haslanger (2012a), and the works cited therein. For a discussion of some relevant
concerns about how the notion of identity has sometimes been deployed in the trans setting, see Reed
(2013).
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‘Sex’ Maximally Construed: ‘Gender’ Minimally Construed:
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Figure 10: A Division of ‘Sex’ and ‘Gender’
Insofar as the traditional ‘sex’ concept is at all coherent, s biology belongs squarely
to ‘sex’. If we take the social construction of sex seriously, A(s, s) should be recognized
as a key component of this construction, as are any c classes that purport to function as
pure ‘sex’ categories, as distinct from social ‘gender’,17 and those class-biology associations
A(c, s) that give these c classes biological meaning. If things like the the binary assumption
of the disjointness of the ‘male’ and ‘female’ sexes belong to ‘sex’, then, as these are
class-class associations, A(c, c) will also include part of the sex subsystem of the overall
sex/gender system. This enumeration of the components of ‘sex’ is (a bit imprecisely)
visualized in Figure 10, where cs contains exactly those c classes that are considered ‘sex’
classes, and c− cs contains all the other c classes.
The remaining five items will belong entirely to ‘gender’. Five of them involve only
c class, p practice, and related associations and identities, and so seem unquestionably
social, and squarely part of gender on the ‘social interpretation of sex’ definition. These
are p practice, class-practice associations A(c, p), practice-practice associations A(p, p),
practice-identity Ip, and class-identity Ic. The remaining two items are the biology-practice
associations A(s, p), and biology-identity Is. The former of these is all about the association
of sex biology with specific behaviors and social conditions, and is solidly part of gender
on this understanding. The latter is social if identities are social, and is a core part of the
notion of gender (identity) in the transgender context.
Turning to the five items that belong in part to ‘sex’, at least three have components
17A relatively good candidate for the status of pure sex class would be ‘intersex’, and a relatively good
candidate for the status of pure gender class would be ‘genderfluid’. Turning to the more widely discussed
binary case, some systems, or at least some theoretical traditions, also distinguish ‘female’ and ‘male’ (the
‘sexes’) from ‘woman’ and ‘man’ (the ‘genders’).
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frequently talked about under the heading of ‘gender’: c class includes genders like ‘man’
and ‘woman’, the class-biology associations A(c, s) include such things as the identifica-
tion of the status of manhood or womanhood with a particular biology (the gendering
of the body), and the class-class associations A(c, c) include things like the traditional
binary gender assumption that the gender classes ‘man’ and ‘woman’ partition the human
population.
Thus, at least ten conceptually distinct components of the taxonomy18 overlap with
the traditional category ‘gender’, as visualized in Figure 10. These ten components do
not have much in common. Some are plausibly personal psychological traits, others are
society-wide systems of norms and stereotypes. Some are relatively abstract social classes,
others are relatively concrete physical behaviors. If gender is understood as including all
of these, then sweeping declarations about the nature or value of gender must be regarded
with suspicion. If, for example, we wish to debate whether gender is innate, or whether it
is worthy of abolition or respect, the heterogeneity that we find here will complicate the
conversation.
As was discussed in the introduction, it is not hard to find declarations to the effect
that gender simply is or isn’t a particular one of these components or combination of
them. That is, ‘gender’ is different things to different people. This is sometimes framed as
a dispute between competing theories of what ‘gender’ really is, but the present approach
regards these less as substantive disagreements than as cases of mismatched terminology,
and tries to provide tools to help clarify what we are talking about on any given occasion.
One thing that this approach does not do provide is a system of concepts that is neatly
split by the old sex/gender distinction – we saw above that, at least when theorizing about
communities that distinguish ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ classes, this distinction plausibly cuts
down the middle of c class and of the class-biology associations A(c, s). This is broadly in
keeping with the often-made point that ‘sex’ is socially constructed just as ‘gender’ is, and
with concerns that privileging ‘sex’ classes as distinct from ‘gender’ classes is conceptually
unjustified or socially pernicious (cf. Rachel Williams (2015)).
3.2 Gender Identity and Dysphoria Revisited
Let’s return to the DSM criteria for gender dysphoria. Some criteria diagnose biology-
identity Is, some class-identity Ic, and some practice-identity Ip, but they are treated
together as indicators of ‘experienced/expressed gender’, and associated with a single
diagnosis. We could equally well imagine a system in which mismatch between one’s
biology-identity Is and one’s s biology was a distinct diagnosis from the corresponding
diagnoses for Ic/c and Ip/p mismatch, but this is not what the DSM provides. Insofar as
this single diagnosis suggests something like a coherent phenomenon, a reader of the DSM
18That is, everything except possibly s and A(s, s).
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will naturally infer a unified gender identity of which biology-identity Is, class-identity Ic,
and practice-identity Ip are components or manifestations.
This unification of Is, Ic, and Ip into a single notion of identity, or the across-the-
board attribution of all three to some common source, is a nontrivial hypothesis. I am not
prepared to conclusively refute it here, but we ought to at least recognize it as a hypothesis,
rather than smuggling it in as a presupposition.19 Failing to do so puts us at risk of
equating these three notions of identity without conceptual or empirical justification.
The assumption of a unified identity underlying all three of these has real implications
for people seeking diagnosis in order to gain access to treatments (e.g., hormone therapy)
or recognition (e.g., appropriate pronouns). For example, gender dysphoria in children
is to be diagnosed based on the presence of at least six out of eight manifestations. At
least one of these is concerned with class-identity Ic, at least three are concerned with
practice-identity Ip, and two are concerned with biology-identity Is. (The other two are
plausibly ambiguous between Ip and Ic.) Further, the most unambiguously Ic-associated
manifestation, ‘A strong desire to be of the other gender or an insistence that one is the
other gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender).’, is required
for a diagnosis.
Applying a little arithmetic to the above reveals that, in children, diagnosis-worthiness
always hinges on more than one of our three distinct identity concepts. A class-identity Ic
at odds with one’s assigned c class is only diagnosis-worthy if it is accompanied by some
manifestations of practice-identity Ip at odds with one’s expected p practices. An Ip at
odds with expected p practice must similarly be supported by a contrary-to-assignment
Ic. Finally, for biology-identity Is at odds with one’s s biology, both Ic and Ip must also
be to some extent stereotypically transgender to allow a diagnosis.
This all means that, for example, a child who was designated male at birth, but
who professes consistent interest in being recognized as a girl and talked about with
‘she’ pronouns (Ic) and in having stereotypically female biology (Is), will be ineligible
for diagnosis unless she also has at least one of a ‘strong preference for cross-dressing or
simulating female attire’, a ‘strong preference for toys, games, or activities stereotypically
engaged in by [girls]’, or a ‘a strong rejection of typically masculine toys, games, and
activities and a strong avoidance of rough-and-tumble play’ (all plausibly manifestations
of Ip). That is, if she is not stereotypically feminine (if, e.g., she is butch, tomboyish, or
gravitates towards gender-neutral clothing and activities), she will not have access to the
diagnosis that would legitimize her preferred pronouns and support the development of a
plan for appropriate hormone therapies. The conflation of independent identity concepts
is credibly a real social harm, and the separation of Is, Ic, and Ip provides a valuable tool
for clearly articulating the flawed reasoning that creates the problem.
19My anecdotal experiences as a transfeminine person, and my discussions with other gender-variant
people, incline me towards extreme skepticism about the prospects of such a unification, but I am aware
that my sample is small, and that such introspection is not always reliable.
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The distinction between Is, Ic, and Ip identities is also important for debates about
the (non-)innateness of gender identity. Innateness claims for Is, Ic, and Ip put pressure
on very different aspects of one’s notion of innateness. For example, innateness claims
for biology-identity Is could be framed in terms of an innate brain-to-body map, perhaps
without too much engagement with thorny issues of social construction. On the other
hand, arguing that class-identity Ic is innate involves fleshing out what it would mean to
have an innate identity or inclination that makes reference to a culture-bound category.
It is, at first glance, perfectly consistent to hold any combination of beliefs about which
of these identities are innate and which are not, and a compelling argument for or against
the innateness of one will, by itself, tell us nothing about the other two.
3.3 Tensions in Activism
This taxonomy also helps to address some tensions in activist rhetoric. To pick one ex-
ample, transfeminists often argue for the independence of gender identity and gender
expression: masculine (cis or trans) women are still women, and may be invested in
thinking of themselves as women, and, similarly, feminine men are still men. This sep-
aration is important for refuting transphobic arguments that assertions of self-identified
manhood or womanhood on the part of trans people are simply misguided responses of
sex-discrimination with regard to allowable gender expression.20 But transfeminists are
also invested in freedom of gender expression as a trans rights issue, and frequently ar-
gue that being unable to engage in one’s favored gendered expressions is a frustration of
something like a personal gender identity. This is important for calling out the policing of
gender expression as a form of cissexist oppression. These two positions are in superficial
tension: gender expression has nothing to do with gender identity but freedom of gender
expression is especially important as a trans issue precisely because of its connection with
gender identity.
The subdivision of ‘gender identity’ eliminates the tension. In the first claim, ‘gender
identity’ means some combination of class-identity Ic and biology-identity Is, while in the
second, it means roughly practice-identity Ip. There is no contradiction or tension in
saying that one’s Ic and Is have nothing to do with one’s actual (p practice) or desired
(practice-identity Ip) gender expression, while at the same time insisting that freedom of
gender expression (p practice) is important for respecting practice-identity Ip.
This illustrates how imprecise ‘gender’ talk can make activism both more confusing
and more rhetorically vulnerable than it needs to be. A finer-grained taxonomy can clarify
activist positions, sparing newcomers to the activist conversation from a sense of playing
conceptual whack-a-mole with a ‘gender’ concept that is first one thing, then another. The
‘gender identity’/‘gender expression’ distinction is useful to activists for just this reason,
and the finer-grained approach allows further clarification.
20See, e.g., Serano (2016) for a representative activist use of this distinction.
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3.4 Abolition Proposals
Calls for an ‘end of gender’ have a complex and troubled history. I leave a detailed
exploration of the subject within the present taxonomy as a problem for future work, but
I’d like to briefly illustrate how this type of more granular approach might be useful in
this setting. As we’ve already seen, the maximal extent of ‘gender’ covers many different
components. Since different people have different of these components in mind, different
people will mean different things when they advocate for an ‘end of gender’, and different
members of their audience will understand different things. And such maneuvers leave
open the possibility of misunderstanding and deception.
To illustrate the problem, consider two types of ‘gender’ abolitionists: a Na¨ıve Anti-
Sexist, and a certain type of Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminist.
Na¨ıve Anti-Sexism: TERF Dystopia:
s p
c
Is Ip
Ic
A
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Figure 11: Two ‘End of Gender’ Scenarios
There is something obviously unjust about having, say, one’s choice of careers or range
of acceptable behavior and attire drastically curtailed on the basis of one’s unchosen
sex characteristics. This type of sexist injustice is a typical feature of biology-practice
associations A(s, p). The Na¨ıve Anti-Sexist takes this as reason to do away with all such
associations, as visualized in Figure 11. We might well argue that the Na¨ıve Anti-Sexist
does not go far enough, but their proposal, or something reasonably approximated by it, is
an important part of the long-term/utopian goal of many feminist projects. By abolishing
these associations A(p, s) the Na¨ıve Anti-Sexist hopes to deprive ‘sex’ (understood here as
s biology) of a major form of social significance, so, working from the ‘social meaning of
sex’ definition of ‘gender’, they might reasonably describe their agenda as one of ‘gender
abolition’.
Next, consider one sort of Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminist (TERF) – very roughly
the sort exemplified by Ivey (2015) and Jeffreys (1997), and criticized by, among others
Serano (2014). The particular (simplified) hypothetical figure I’d like to consider agrees
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with the Na¨ıve Anti-Sexist that the biology-practice associations A(s, p) have to go, but
they take on three other (in principle independent) positions. First, our TERF wishes to
do away with the c classes, a move which is to be accompanied by the disappearance of
class identity Ic and of the various A(s, c), A(c, c), and A(c, p) associations, regarding these
as having no legitimate purpose, and as reinforcing various biology-practice associations
A(s, p). Second, they reject the idea that biology-identity Is can be non-pathological. They
hold that a well-adjusted person ought to be ready (in principle) to accept any sexed body
that they’re issued by ‘natural’ circumstances, and that biology-identity Is is at odds with
this and thus a pathology – at best a psychological adaptation temporarily justified by
the current horrors, and at worst a motive for ‘self-mutilation’. Third, our TERF holds
that a large class of p practices (call them the f practices) are inherently oppressive and so
ought to be abolished. The f practices are understood as including virtually all behaviors
and artifacts stereotyped as ‘feminine’, and are held to be universally costly or dangerous
forms of ritualized female submission. Our TERF envisions a world where the f practices
have been so thoroughly purged that any practice-oriented identities and inclinations Ip
that concern them are likewise extinguished. Our TERF collectively characterizes all these
different components as one grand program of ‘gender abolition’.21
A detailed critique of these positions is beyond the scope of this paper, but let’s
note that our Na¨ıve Anti-Sexist and our TERF have very different agendas, which both
of them understandably call ‘gender abolition’, and that any number of other more or
less drastic, or possibly entirely independent, projects could also reasonably bear this
label. These projects have have very different commitments, and are vulnerable to very
different criticisms, but because phrases like ‘end of gender’ and ‘gender abolition’ do not
disambiguate between them, and because available theories of gender do not provide the
needed granularity to easily clarify what is and isn’t included under the heading of ‘gender’,
confusion can easily arise. The Na¨ıve Anti-Sexist, may sincerely call for an ‘end of gender’,
and be met with accusations, informed by the TERF’s usage, that such abolition attacks
the legitimate desire of many trans people for medical transition, or that it needlessly
harms all people with ‘feminine’ interests or inclinations. The Na¨ıve Anti-Sexist will find
these accusations quite baﬄing, and it will seem to them that the critics have inexplicably
changed the subject.
Worse than such misunderstandings is the way that the TERF can abuse the vagueness
of gender talk to equivocate between different notions of ‘gender abolition’. They can use
this as a recruitment tool, enlisting the support of less thoughtful Na¨ıve Anti-Sexists. They
may, for example, point to the negative reaction they receive from transfeminists ‘just for
advocating an end of gender’ (in their sense of ‘end of gender’), and so present themself
as an embattled champion of what the Na¨ıve Anti-Sexist may be induced to conflate with
21The present taxonomy can help us to see how these various projects don’t really have all that much
to do with each other, and target very different parts of the overall system.
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their own position. With an especially careless mark, the TERF can simply trade on the
vagueness of ‘gender’ talk to suggest that anybody who is really a gender abolitionist (i.e.,
who subscribes to Na¨ıve Anti-Sexist reasoning) ought to be in favor of the TERF’s whole
agenda, which simply calls for a systematic abolition of ‘gender’.
No taxonomy will resolve the substantive debates regarding the merits and drawbacks
of these positions, but the proposed taxonomy allows us to clearly characterize the differ-
ence between these positions, making it possible to conduct the debate in a more precise
manner, and empowers us to clarify misunderstandings and call out equivocations.
4 Further Directions
The taxonomy presented above is not intended as the final word on the matter, but only
as a proof-of-concept for the sort of taxonomic project that identifies some collection of
elements as the ones that participate in relations and are the objects of identities, and then
allows for some kind of combinatorial exhaustion of associations and identities derived from
these. It is not intended as the last word on the matter. Indeed, it is unlikely that a single
canonical taxonomy is possible or desirable. Below, I sketch some possible extensions and
refinements..
4.1 Lack of a Rigorously-Defined Semantics
I have not committed to a specific treatment of the semantics of the I and A(·, ·) operations,
but have relied on the reader’s intuitive notions of ‘identity’ and ‘association’. This suffices
for some purposes, but is inadequate for others.
If one looks for a more explicit semantics for the I operation, difficult questions begin
to occur almost immediately. To what extent are identities a more or less individual,
internal, ‘between your ears’ matter, and to what extent is it dependent on one’s position
in a society and one’s connections with others? To what extent does having an x identity
Ix require having attitudes explicitly about x, and to what extent is it sufficient that x
merely have the right sort of causal influence on the formation of the identity?22 Should
we try to distinguish between identities and inclinations, and, if we do, what theory of
inclinations should we use? It has been convenient to abstract away from the exact choice
of a theory of identity, but for some purposes we will need to be more explicit about this.
My treatment of A(·, ·) likewise leaves the intended meaning of ‘association’ quite open-
ended. I have not said anything to distinguish between inferential, causal, normative, and
other associations. Which of these should be included, and how should each be formalized?
As with I, it may, for many purposes, be for the best if we avoid these issue, but for certain
purposes it may be necessary to commit to a particular intended semantics.
22This issue is explicitly taken up by Haslanger (2012a), Jenkins (2015), and Diaz-Leon (2016).
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4.2 Adjusting Granularity
Nothing necessitates the choice of s, p, and c as basic components. The decision to
individuate basic components in a particular way depends on the project at hand, and
subdividing any of them would provide a richer taxonomy. p practice, for example, does
not distinguish between a person’s behaviors, and their externally imposed experiences,
and the artifacts associated with these. We might also try to collapse some distinctions:
the boundary between s and p is, as already noted, fuzzy, and there may be purposes
for which, following Mikkola (2010), it is better to replace both with a single ‘descriptive
traits’ component. Given any choice of basic components, we can proceed to apply the I
and A(·, ·) operations as we did above. The special case of a the three-way division of s,
p, and c was chosen with certain conversations about the sex/gender system in mind, but
other projects may require other choices.
We could, similarly, recognize two or more identity operations (splitting I into distinct
operations I′, I′′, etc.), or do the same for A(·, ·). One response to the problem of choosing
an interpretation of ‘identity’ is to decide that more than one candidate interpretation is
of interest, and to use a distinct operation for each. a subdivision of A(·, ·) may be useful
for analogous reasons.
4.3 Non-Binary Associations
We need not limit ourselves to two-place associations: there may be three-place asso-
ciations that are not adequately captured by any combination of two-place ones. One
example of a norm that might require this treatment is ‘women with large breasts should
wear a bra’, which interrelates c class (women), s biology (large breasts), and p practice
(wearing a bra). In the absence of a more developed semantics for A(·, ·), it is hard to
say whether this move is strictly required, but the above at least makes something like
A(s, c, p) intuitively appealing.
4.4 Recursion and Related Matters
Another obvious direction for refinement would be the recursive application of the identity
and association operations. Suppose, for example, that it is a matter of great personal
importance for somebody that their wearing a skirt serves as a signal of non-man status.
We might try to place this within the taxonomy above, or we might argue that this is
beyond the scope of the this sort of theory, but we might also say that this is an instance
of my identity with respect to class-practice associations – my IA(c,p). It might also be that
identities can participate in associations. Consider a norm like ‘it is proper to call some-
body a man iff they identify as a man’: this might plausibly be treated as an instance of
A(Ic, p). These types of recursion raise the possibility of an infinite sex/gender taxonomy.
To explore this, we’ll probably need a more developed semantics of I and A(·, ·). For now,
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the non-recursive version provides a more manageable starting point, while illustrating
the benefits of the general approach.
Above, I’ve tried to show the benefits of developing a taxonomy of gender concepts
by systematic application of A(·, ·) association and I identity operations to a chosen class
of basic components (here s, c, and p). The resulting taxonomy has subdivided the
sex/gender system more finely than available competitors, and has served both as a proof-
of-concept for this type of taxonomy, and as a useful tool for investigating certain theoret-
ical and political problems. I am hopeful that further exploration will identify additional
exploration and suggest further refinements.
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